**Summary of Grenfell Tower Phase 1 and 2 recommendations**

**From Executive summary of Phase 1 report:**

Part V: Recommendations *(intro 2 paras shortened a little, other text is in full)*

Phase 1 was limited to investigating the course of events during the night of 14 June 2017 and much work remains to be done, it has already become clear that some important steps need to be taken to improve fire safety, including the response of the LFB and other fire and rescue services to major disasters, including fires in high-rise residential buildings.

Chapter 33 contains recommendations arising out of the evidence heard in Phase 1 and the findings of fact based on it. It would not be appropriate to make recommendations at this stage in relation to matters that have not been the subject of investigation, such as the regime surrounding the testing and certification of building materials, even though there are grounds for thinking that changes may need to be made. The chapter does not lend itself to being summarised and should be read in full, because it sets out my recommendations in detail and explains the basis on which they are being made (or in some cases why certain recommendations are not being made). In summary, however, I make recommendations for change in relation to the following matters:

a. The information made available to fire and rescue services about the materials and methods of construction used in the external walls of high-rise residential buildings.

b. The arrangements made by the LFB to discharge its duties under section 7(2)(d) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.

c. The availability of plans of high-rise residential buildings to local fire and rescue services and the provision of premises information boxes in high-rise residential buildings.

d. The regular inspection and testing of lifts designed for use by firefighters.

e. Communication between the LFB control room and the incident commander.

f. The way in which fire and rescue services handle emergency calls.

g. The LFB’s command and control procedures and use of resources, in particular the capture of information from crews returning from deployments and the sharing of information between the LFB control room, the incident commander and the bridgehead.

h. The communication equipment available to the LFB for use by crews deployed in firefighting and rescue operations in high-rise buildings.

i. The evacuation of high-rise residential buildings, including the provision of equipment enabling firefighters to send an evacuation signal to the whole or a selected part of the building.

j. The provision of fire safety information to residents of high-rise residential buildings and the marking of floor levels in lobbies and staircase landings.

k. The inspection of fire doors and self-closing devices.

l. Aspects of co-operation between the emergency services.

**Press release of Phase 2 report**

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry has today (4 September) published its second and final report into the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the fire at Grenfell Tower in the early hours of 14 June 2017.

The publication of the Phase 2 report marks the end of a process that began on 15 June 2017 when then Prime Minister Theresa May announced a public inquiry to examine the disaster with a view to ensuring that a similar disaster could never occur again. The fire at Grenfell Tower was the worst residential fire in the UK since the Second World War and resulted in the deaths of 72 people.

The Phase 1 report was published on 30 October 2019 and focused on the events of 14 June 2017: how the fire started, how it escaped from the flat where it had begun and how it spread over the whole building with tragic consequences.

Phase 2 of the Inquiry examined the underlying causes of the fire to identify where mistakes were made and how Grenfell Tower came to be in a condition which allowed the fire to spread in the way identified by Phase 1. It also investigated the response of the authorities to the emergency.

Introducing the report, Inquiry Chairman the Rt Hon Sir Martin Moore-Bick explained that the second part of the investigations had taken longer than originally hoped because, as those investigations progressed, the Inquiry uncovered many more matters of concern than had previously been expected.

The Inquiry report finds that the deaths that occurred were all avoidable “and that those who lived in Grenfell Tower were badly failed over a number of years by those who were responsible for ensuring the safety of its occupants.”

“They include the government, the Tenant Management Organisation, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, those who manufactured and supplied the materials used in the refurbishment, those who certified their suitability for use on high-rise residential buildings, the architect, Studio E, the principal contractor, Rydon Maintenance Ltd, and some of its sub-contractors, in particular, Harley Curtain Wall Ltd and its successor Harley Facades Ltd, some of the consultants, in particular the fire engineer, Exova Warringtonfire Ltd, the local authority’s building control department and the London Fire Brigade,” Sir Martin said.

Sir Martin went on to explain that while not all of them bear the same degree of responsibility for the eventual disaster, “all contributed to it in one way or another, in most cases through incompetence but in some cases through dishonesty and greed.” Panel member and architect Thouria Istephan, who spent nearly 30 years as an architect before joining the Inquiry in 2020, said:

“Our report identifies what we think is needed to make sure that the legacy of Grenfell is real and brings about lasting change. Our recommendations place new burdens and responsibilities on people and organisations”.

Ms Istephan continued: “I make no apologies for that: put simply, if you work in the construction industry and you do not feel the weight of the responsibility you have for keeping people safe - you are in the wrong job.”

Former housing association chief executive Ali Akbor OBE, who joined the Inquiry as a Panel Member in 2020, said:

“I hope that our report acts as a reminder to the clients of future building projects - including social housing providers - that they have a responsibility to the users of their buildings to ensure that safety is not sacrificed to the demands of speed and cost.”

Mr Akbor concluded by adding:

“We cannot in a few words here today do full justice to the totality of our report. What is needed is for those with responsibility for building safety - in my sector as in Thouria’s - to read the report, to reflect on it, and to treat Grenfell as a touchstone in all that they do in the future. To act with professionalism, with competence, and to put people first.”

Recommendations put forward by the Inquiry panel include:

* bringing responsibility for all aspects of fire safety under one government Department;
* the appointment of a construction regulator to oversee all aspects of the construction industry;
* the establishment of a body of professional fire engineers, properly regulated and with protected status and the introduction of mandatory fire safety strategies for higher-risk buildings;
* a licensing scheme for contractors wishing to undertake the construction or refurbishment of higher-risk buildings;
* the regulation and mandatory accreditation of fire risk assessors;
* the establishment of a College of Fire and Rescue to provide practical, educational and managerial training to fire and rescue services.
* the introduction of a requirement for the government to maintain a publicly accessible record of recommendations made by select committees, coroners and public inquiries, describing the steps taken in response or its reasons for declining to implement them.

The Panel expressed its gratitude to all those who had supported the Inquiry through giving evidence and providing statements to assist its investigations, in particular the bereaved, survivors and residents of Grenfell Tower.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry opened on 14 September 2017. During the course of its investigations it disclosed over 300,000 documents to 646 Core Participants, obtained over 1500 witness statements and sat for more than 300 days, most of which were devoted to taking evidence from a wide range of factual and expert witnesses.

NOTES

Inquiry Chairman: The Rt Hon Sir Martin Moore-Bick, Panel Members: Thouria Istephan and Ali Akbor OBE

The Inquiry report can be found [here](https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-2-report) and the introduction to the Phase Two report by the Inquiry Chairman and Panel given at 11am on Wednesday 4th September at Dorland House, west London, can be found [here](https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/news/statement-publication-phase-2-report)